The 2027 State Budget

Prof. Doutor Rui Teixeira Santos
Chairman of the Board

Budget decisions, population, housing and pensions

The yardstick for a budget decision

The Budget determines how much income remains available, which services the State is able to provide and which burdens will be passed on to future years. I assess public finances by their results. Balanced accounts and debt must be weighed together with unmet needs and the cost of postponing solutions.

The Government of Luís Montenegro and Miranda Sarmento should be judged by that yardstick. Acknowledging a fall in the debt ratio is compatible with questioning the composition of spending, the revenue forecasts and the execution of investment. Serious criticism begins with knowing the documents.

I therefore want to explain the choices in this Budget, the process through which they are made and the alternative I propose. Purchasing power, housing and pensions will be central to that alternative. These are responsibilities that require funded decisions and continuity in delivery.

What the 2027 figures allow us to conclude

The Government forecasts real growth of 2.1%, a surplus of 0.1% of gross domestic product and public debt of 84.5% of GDP in 2027. These are forecasts. Whether they materialise will depend on economic activity and on the implementation of the measures. 1

The Public Finance Council considers the Government’s forecast for the budget balance plausible. Its own projection, incorporating the known measures, points to a deficit of 0.1%. Both scenarios are close to balance. The difference warrants monitoring, but does not justify presenting it as a catastrophe that has already happened. 2

The forecast fall in public investment is one of this Budget’s weaknesses. The scenario analysed by the CFP points to a real contraction of 32.5%, accompanied by a 10.4% rise in private investment. Apparent labour productivity would grow by only 0.7%. These are real changes, which should not be confused with nominal amounts. 3

The end of the RRP helps to explain the fall, but it requires a well-prepared transition. Infrastructure, schools and health facilities need continuity of investment and maintenance. An expectation of private expansion does not secure these public functions. The Government should identify what will be completed, what will continue with national funding and what will be postponed.

The 10.4% rise in private investment is a demanding assumption. Which projects underpin it? In which sectors, with what funding and on what timetable? The aggregate figure does not show how much depends on domestic or foreign capital. If the bet rests on foreign investment, the Government should say so explicitly, show the commitments already in place and distinguish productive projects from acquisitions of existing assets.

Without that breakdown, the robustness of the scenario remains unproven. If private investment falls short and public investment falls as forecast, growth and revenue will be exposed. I argue for a deliverable public investment portfolio and a contingency scenario to protect essential projects.

It is also necessary to distinguish the trend in tax revenue from the combined trend in taxes and social contributions. The official presentation keeps the tax and contribution burden at 35% of GDP in 2027, as in the estimate for 2026. There are tax cuts that benefit specific taxpayers; the aggregate weight of compulsory payments calls for a reading of its own. 1

On the spending side, the end of the RRP profoundly alters the comparison between years. According to the CFP, excluding that effect, planned spending rises by 5.7%. The Council also identifies a possible overestimation of interest payments and doubts about other budget lines. The composition of the accounts deserves as much attention as the final result. 2

My question to the Government concerns its capacity to respond: which measures will be adjusted if revenue grows less than expected? Which investment will be protected? How will permanent commitments be honoured?

The Government should publish an adverse scenario, with quantified consequences and identified priorities. This would allow alternatives to be discussed before implementation difficulties force postponements or spending freezes.

Population, employment and the revision of budget ratios

The OECD country note on Portugal reports 319,000 long-term or permanent admissions in 2025, 130% more than in 2024. This includes changes of status and free movement. The report links the sharp increase to the processing of pending residence applications, so the total does not correspond only to people who arrived that year. 18 24

Statistics Portugal (INE) reports 254,253 permanent immigrants in 2025, including returning Portuguese nationals. 19 I call for a public comparison of the concepts, sources and dates. The divergence between indicators does not, in itself, prove government manipulation.

Nor can we add those admissions to the 1.7 million foreign-born people the OECD reports for 2024 and announce two million resident immigrants. Overlaps, departures and deaths must be netted out. Place of birth, nationality and annual inflows measure different realities. 18

INE estimates 11.424 million residents at the end of 2025, following a methodological revision, of whom around 1.6 million hold foreign nationality. 20 Total GDP measures the economy’s output; GDP per head relates that output to the population. If real GDP and the population both grow by 2%, average output per person is unchanged. 21

Portugal is close to full employment. The CFP itself uses that description. 23 Remaining unemployment includes skills and location mismatches, as well as normal turnover between jobs. The capacity to mobilise resident workers quickly therefore has limits; we cannot treat it as an inexhaustible reserve.

Taking six million employed people as a rounded base for the exercise, 1% corresponds to 60,000 people and 2% to 120,000. With constant productivity per worker, growing by 2% would require 120,000 more people in work. The base for this calculation is actual employment. The labour force also includes the unemployed. 25

This benchmark makes it possible to discuss the scale of labour needs. To estimate the immigration required, we must also take into account retirements, emigration, skills and family members who do not work. Productivity gains reduce the need for additional employment for the same growth. The 120,000 is not, therefore, a stand-alone estimate of immigrant inflows.

There is also a change that matters for budget execution. INE plans to revise employment figures in February 2027 and the National Accounts for 2021 to 2026 in March. The revision will arrive when the 2027 State Budget is already being implemented and may change the assessment of its results. INE has not announced the size of the revision. 20

To anticipate the consequences, I consider a scenario in which the level of GDP is revised up by 15%. This is an analytical assumption, to be confirmed. If the revision also raises the nominal GDP used for 2027 by 15%, with budget amounts unchanged, the ratios become the previous value divided by 1.15. A correction to 2025 does not automatically carry over to 2027.

In that scenario, the debt forecast in the Budget, 84.5% of GDP, would fall to around 73.5%, with no additional reduction in euros. 1 The weight of pensions, social support and public spending would also fall, with amounts unchanged. A deficit would become less negative as a percentage of GDP; a surplus would carry a smaller percentage weight. 22

This effect may influence the assessment of sustainability and the debate on fiscal space during 2027. The statistical revision does not, in itself, increase revenue collected or authorised appropriations. The European net expenditure path still requires compliance, or revision through the applicable procedures. 6

Population growth, including through immigration, adds to demand for housing and to healthcare needs. When supply does not keep pace, pressure on rents and services increases. The impact depends on households, ages and location. The OECD identifies persistent constraints on housing supply; the European Commission points to staff shortages and territorial inequalities in the National Health Service (SNS). 2627

I argue that the Government should present, with an independent assessment by the CFP, a breakdown between statistical revision, actual growth and budget decisions, recalculating previous years on a comparable basis. Funding for housing and for the SNS should follow the population actually resident and the needs of each area.

The three timetables of the decision

A Member State’s budget is a national decision. Its preparation is part of a European process that precedes the parliamentary vote and continues during implementation. The Union does not approve all budgets at a single meeting: there is a sequence of assessments, recommendations and decisions with distinct consequences.

Three overlapping timetables should be distinguished. The first is the domestic constitutional and legal cycle of submission, debate, approval and implementation. The second is the European Semester, which coordinates economic, fiscal and employment policies. The third is multiannual programming, currently centred on the medium-term fiscal-structural plans.

An annual law may meet national deadlines and yet depart from the multiannual path; a European plan may receive a favourable recommendation without securing parliamentary authorisation for each item of spending. Consistency requires linking the three levels without confusing them.

In the domestic timetable, the Government prepares the proposal and submits it to the Assembleia da República (Portuguese Parliament), as a rule by 10 October. This is followed by the debate in principle, the detailed debate and the final overall vote. Members of Parliament may table amendments. Parliamentary approval is followed by the remaining constitutional acts required for entry into force. 4

In the European timetable, spring is already a time for reporting and assessment. The annual progress report must be submitted by 30 April. The Commission’s analysis and the Council’s recommendations feed into the preparation of national decisions. In the autumn, euro area countries submit a draft budgetary plan by 15 October; the Commission issues an opinion by 30 November. 5

It is at this intersection that a decisive part of the budgetary commitment may be formed, before public debate focuses on the annual proposal. Parliament needs to know the assumptions and alternatives discussed by the Government throughout this process.

I argue for a parliamentary debate before the most significant multiannual commitments are submitted. I also argue that the progress report should be debated with information on implementation, risks and deviations. Democratic scrutiny is most useful when a choice can still be changed.

The Government should explain how it proposed the path, which alternatives it examined and why it chose a particular distribution of effort across the years. Taking part in shaping these commitments is a requirement of responsible sovereignty.

What changed in the European rules in 2024

The 2024 reform reorganised fiscal surveillance. National plans cover four or five years, in line with the normal length of a parliamentary term. The adjustment period is, as a rule, four years and may be extended to seven in return for reform and investment commitments. Net expenditure has become the operational centre of surveillance. 6

This indicator excludes, among other items, interest, spending on EU programmes matched by Union revenue, eligible national co-financing, cyclical unemployment components and one-off measures. It also takes account of discretionary revenue measures. A tax cut may therefore make it harder to stay on the path. 6

Portugal submitted a plan for 2025 to 2028. The Council recommendation of January 2025 set maximum net expenditure growth rates of 5% in 2025, 5.1% in 2026, 1.2% in 2027 and 3.3% in 2028. The tighter profile for 2027 is part of the commitment put forward by the Portuguese Government. 7

It is important to understand what 1.2% means: it is the nominal growth of this indicator. It does not correspond to a 1.2% cut in all public spending. The room for a new priority depends on its revenue, its financing and how it enters the European indicator.

Flexibility mechanisms exist. Using them requires justification and monitoring. On 30 October, the Commission recommended to the Council that Portugal’s national escape clause be extended to eligible energy security measures. That document is a Commission recommendation for a Council decision; the eligibility of specific measures requires assessment. 8

Flexibility can make it possible to respond to exceptional needs. Debt and the running costs of investments still have to be financed. Each project needs to be assessed on its cost, its public usefulness and the operating costs it leaves behind.

Deviations from the path are recorded in a control account. The thresholds of 0.3 percentage points of GDP in a single year and 0.6 cumulatively are relevant to the European assessment. Crossing a threshold does not mean an automatic fine: the framework requires further conditions and decisions, including an assessment of the budgetary position and the relevant factors. 9

The position I defend is to take part in setting the rules and to negotiate paths compatible with the country’s growth capacity. Once commitments have been made, we must implement them transparently and use the legal review mechanisms where there are grounds to do so. Credibility is built by explaining choices and demonstrating results.

The role of the Public Finance Council

The Public Finance Council is an independent institution. It assesses forecasts, rules, debt, commitments and execution, in accordance with its mandate. It takes no instructions from the Government or from political parties. Its work improves the information available for decision-making. 10

Macroeconomic endorsement does not determine political priorities. We can debate technical conclusions by presenting data and reasons to assess the divergence.

In its November assessment, the CFP drew attention to the dependence of revenue on employment and wages, and to doubts about the calculation of net expenditure and of the defence flexibility. These are questions that deserve documented answers. 11

The 2024 European reform strengthens the conditions for the independence of fiscal institutions. For certain assessments, it also provides that the State should either follow them or publicly explain the reasons for departing from them. 12

I argue that Parliament should have the time, technical capacity and access to information needed to examine the proposal and the amendments. The CFP and UTAO (Parliament’s Technical Budget Support Unit) have their own functions, which must be respected and properly resourced. Democratic decision-making benefits from demanding technical assessment and from a clear identification of who bears political responsibility.

The content of the Budget and parliamentary initiative

I have criticised a conception of public finance that reduces the budget to an exercise in accounting forecasts. The Government has announced a simplification of the Budget Law’s provisions, removing rules with no budgetary content. That approach may improve the quality of the law. The problem arises if measures with significant financial impact are moved away from the moment when Parliament discusses the means to implement them. 1

I argue that public policy options should be presented together with their budgetary consequences. A pension reform, a tax benefit or a housing programme requires a decision on financing. The Assembly must be able to relate the proposed rights and objectives to appropriations, future liabilities and alternatives.

The relevant constitutional provision is the so-called «lei-travão» (budget brake rule). Article 167(2) restricts parliamentary initiatives that increase expenditure or reduce revenue provided for in the Budget in the current financial year. The time limit is decisive to understanding the scope of this rule. 13

During 2026, a stand-alone parliamentary initiative may provide for financial effects only from 2027, provided it complies with the other constitutional and legal requirements. Deferring those effects to the following financial year is one way of respecting the time limit. Constitutional case law underlines this distinction. 14

Once we are in 2027, an opposition initiative seeking to increase expenditure or reduce revenue in that same year, beyond what is provided for, will already run up against the constitutional restriction. Moving a debate to after January may therefore reduce the opposition’s ability to give it financial effect within 2027.

We must preserve the debate on measures with a budgetary impact during the preparation and approval of the Budget. We can also debate stand-alone legislation in good time, specifying the date on which it takes effect and ensuring it is aligned with the following budget. Parliament retains its legislative initiative throughout the year; the budget brake rule constrains financial effects in the current financial year.

I propose that each significant measure be accompanied by a public fact sheet: first-year cost, cost once fully in place, financing and timetable. This method should also apply to parliamentary proposals. A transparent estimate makes it possible to compare choices and improve a proposal before the vote.

Multiannual programmes should identify 2027 execution and subsequent commitments. Lasting reforms may justify their own legislation, debated in parallel and with explicit financial effects.

Simplifying the law should strengthen Parliament’s capacity to decide and to scrutinise.

If we were in government, we would begin by presenting a complete map of commitments and risks: contracts, guarantees, partnerships, future liabilities and projects under way. On the basis of that survey, we would set priorities and a timetable for decisions. The proposals I defend would have to pass that assessment.

In reforming the State, we would review programmes and contracts against concrete objectives: reducing duplication, simplifying procedures and improving service to the public. We would publish the results and the costs per service. Savings would only be used to fund permanent measures once their lasting nature had been demonstrated.

Tax relief would give priority to income from work and to predictability for investors. Each change would have a published cost and a source of funding. The assessment would consider households’ net income and economic outcomes, including the red tape and context costs that continue to weigh on businesses.

In the post-RRP transition, we would choose projects that are ready for implementation and of demonstrated usefulness. The decision would include maintenance and operation. An investment only fulfils its purpose when the infrastructure or service is actually available for use.

Housing

On housing, we would develop an immediate response based on the existing stock and a programme of new supply. The release of vacant public homes would begin with properties that have been identified, are legally unencumbered and are habitable or easy to refurbish. The full inventory would continue in parallel.

I propose competitive sale, home by home, to the private and cooperative sectors, with independent valuation, identification of the beneficial owner and use obligations known before purchase. The homes would be used as permanent owner-occupied housing or let at controlled rents. Selling in individual lots would widen access and allow compliance to be monitored.  15

For rented homes, the obligation would last five years of actual eligible use. The count would start with the first tenancy in force reported to the Tax Authority, with identified and eligible tenants. Periods of works or vacancy would not count. The obligation would be measured by the time during which the home actually serves its housing purpose.

Once the required period had ended, the programme’s specific obligation would lapse, while tenancies in force and the protections of general law would be preserved. The initial valuation would have to reflect that temporary obligation correctly. Monitoring would publish homes awarded, works completed, occupancy and compliance with deadlines.

The first auctions could go ahead with the lots already prepared, within the proposed timetable of up to 180 days. Sale proceeds would be presented separately from the programme’s costs. As one-off revenue, their use would have to reflect that nature.

We would also prepare new urban centres in the Lisbon and Porto regions, with transport, water, sanitation, schools and other facilities. The State would take on planning and core infrastructure; housing supply would draw on municipalities, cooperatives and private investment, in line with their respective responsibilities.

The concession of public land for long periods, including the 99-year solution I have advocated, would be contracted with rules on delivery and use. The scale of each operation would depend on its urban planning, environmental and financial viability. The budget would show the expenditure for each phase and future liabilities. The immediate response and the expansion of supply require different timetables, which should be known from the outset.

National Health Service

In the SNS, we would align the funding and staffing of local health units with the population actually resident, its age structure and the needs of each area. Housing and demographic planning would have to be matched by capacity in primary care, outpatient appointments and emergency services, with published targets for access and delivery. 27

Pensions

On pensions, we would begin by clearly separating the liabilities of the CGA, the contributory social insurance system and non-contributory protection. Consolidated accounts are necessary to assess public finances; identifying each liability is equally necessary to decide fairly.

The Budget report forecasts a balance of around €8.4 billion for Social Security as a whole in 2027, on a public accounting basis. That figure is not the surplus of the contributory scheme alone. Nor does it represent funds fully available for new permanent measures. Its scope and future commitments need to be known. 16

I argue that the State should take on the liabilities of the closed CGA scheme and that social insurance contributions should be assessed against the system’s own obligations. Structural surpluses should strengthen the scheme’s reserves and stability. Once that protection is in place, they should be able to improve the entitlements of those who have contributed.

I have proposed a rule that takes into account the financial balance of the three previous years, with prudential protection of the FEFSS (Social Security Financial Stabilisation Fund) and an independent actuarial assessment. Where there are persistent surpluses and sufficient reserves, the financial improvement could offset increases in the retirement age or allow that age to be gradually reduced. 17

Longevity should be part of the sustainability assessment. Trends in the wage bill, productivity and contributory capacity should also be considered. The rule should allow a structural improvement to be reflected in entitlements, with annual limits, predictability and monitoring.

It is important to distinguish the normal pensionable age from the sustainability factor applied to certain early retirements. Revising the two mechanisms requires separate legal solutions. Long careers and arduous occupations deserve explicit treatment in that revision.

We would also give priority to protecting the real income of the lowest pensions. We would compare the effect of properly funded permanent increases with that of one-off supplements. Pensioners need predictability for their monthly expenses. Non-contributory benefits would continue to require adequate, identified funding from the State.

How we would govern

We would present these options to Parliament with their costs and discuss European commitments while they can still be influenced. We would respond to technical assessments with public information. During implementation, we would account for the objectives met and for any deviations requiring correction.

This is the governing approach I defend: sustainable public accounts that make it possible to deliver public policies, and responsibilities clearly identified before citizens. The 2027 Budget should be judged by its capacity to meet those responsibilities.

Notes and sources

Speaker’s supporting documentation. This section is not part of the 30-minute address. Reference date for information: 12 November 2026. The 2027 indicators are forecasts; the measures presented in the closing section are governing proposals put forward by the speaker.

GDP revision scenario and 2027 State Budget ratios

Conditional exercise using the ratios forecast in the 2027 State Budget. It assumes that the revision raises 2027 nominal GDP by 15% and that the euro amounts of debt, revenue and the balance remain unchanged. The 15% increase is an analytical scenario chosen by the speaker, with no official confirmation. Sources: notes 1, 20, 22 and 23.

 

Indicator 2027 State Budget GDP +15% scenario
Public debt / GDP 84.5% 84.5 / 1.15 ≈ 73.5%
Tax and social contribution revenue / GDP 35.0% 35.0 / 1.15 ≈ 30.4%
Budget balance / GDP +0.1% 0,1 / 1.15 ≈ +0.087%

The same denominator effect applies to pensions, social support and other spending, with euro amounts unchanged: each ratio is divided by 1.15, a relative reduction of around 13.04%. A deficit moves closer to zero; a surplus shrinks as a percentage of GDP. The revision of 2025 GDP only changes these 2027 values to the extent that it also feeds through to 2027 GDP. The statistical revision does not create cash revenue, nor does it automatically expand appropriations or the net expenditure path.

Employment and productivity. In an exercise with six million people in work and constant productivity per worker, 1% growth requires 60,000 more people in work and 2% requires 120,000 more. Translating this into immigration also depends on replacement due to retirement or emigration, participation, skills and household composition. If real GDP and the average population both grow by 2%, real GDP per head remains unchanged. Sources for definitions: notes 21 and 25.

References

[1] Ministry of Finance. Apresentação do Orçamento do Estado 2027 [Presentation of the 2027 State Budget], 8 October 2026. Slides 7, 23 and 30: scenario, tax and contribution burden, and simplification of the Budget Law’s provisions.View

[2] Public Finance Council. Análise da Proposta de Orçamento do Estado para 2027 [Analysis of the 2027 State Budget Proposal], Report No 08/2026, 26 October 2026, pp. [por confirmar]. See also the CFP clarification on the 2027 State Budget Proposal, 28 October: plausibility of the Government’s surplus and the CFP’s central projection of −0.1% of GDP. View

[3] Public Finance Council. Previsões macroeconómicas subjacentes à Proposta de Orçamento do Estado para 2027 [Macroeconomic forecasts underlying the 2027 State Budget Proposal], Opinion No 05/2026, dated 7 October and published on 8 October 2026, pp. 15, 17 and 18, Table 2. Public and private investment: real changes; nominal changes differ. View

[4] Assembleia da República. Sobre o Orçamento do Estado [About the State Budget]. Budgetary Framework Law, approved by Law No 151/2015 of 11 September, Article 36, as currently in force. Constitution, Articles 105, 106 and 161(g). View

[5] Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, Articles 6 and 7, CELEX 32013R0473; Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, Articles 3, 4 and 21, CELEX 32024R1263. Timetable: annual progress report by 30 April; draft budgetary plan by 15 October; Commission opinion by 30 November. View

[6] Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of 29 April 2024, Articles 2, 5, 13, 14, 17 and 22. OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024. CELEX 32024R1263. Distinguish the duration of the plan from the duration of the adjustment. View

[7] Council Recommendation of 21 January 2025 endorsing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan of Portugal. OJ C, C/2025/641, 10.2.2025, Annex I. Annual path: 5.0%; 5.1%; 1.2%; 3.3%. View

[8] European Commission. COM(2026) 604 final, 30 October 2026, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on extending Portugal’s national escape clause to energy security. Preparatory document for the Council decision; the eligibility assessment of specific measures is not automatic. See also Communication C/2026/4514 of 18 August 2026. View

[9] Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 of 29 April 2024, Article 1, replacing Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, in particular paragraphs 2 to 5. OJ L, 2024/1264, 30.4.2024. CELEX 32024R1264. The thresholds are part of a conditional procedure; they are not equivalent to an automatic sanction. View

[10] Law No 54/2011 of 19 October, Statutes of the Public Finance Council, as currently in force, Articles 4 to 8 and 16: mission, independence, powers, reports and safeguards. View

[11] Public Finance Council. Apreciação da Proposta de Orçamento do Estado para 2027 [Assessment of the 2027 State Budget Proposal]. Address by the Chair of the Senior Board to the Assembleia da República, dated 5 November 2026, pp. 1–2; publication page of 6 November 2026. View

[12] Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024, Article 1, inserting Article 8a into Directive 2011/85/EU; paragraphs 4 to 6 of that Article: independence, tasks, and comply-or-explain for certain assessments. OJ L, 2024/1265, 30.4.2024. CELEX 32024L1265. View

[13] Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 167(2). The budget brake rule refers to the current financial year. See also Article 105(2) on obligations arising from law and contract. View

[14] Constitutional Court. Judgment No 880/2024, case No 447/2024, points 12.1 to 12.4. Review of a regional instrument from Madeira; reasoning on the temporal scope of the constitutional budget brake rule and of the regional statutory provision. View

[15] Rui Teixeira Santos. Programa de reintrodução de habitação pública desocupada no mercado [Programme to return vacant public housing to the market], 2 November 2026, pp. 1–4. Author’s proposal: individual competitive sale; five years of actual eligible residential use; start with prepared lots. The proposed scheme should not be confused with law already in force. View

[16] Government. Proposta de Lei n.º 110/XVII/2.ª [Bill No 110/XVII/2], 2027 State Budget, Report, section on Social Security. Diário da Assembleia da República, Series II-A, No 15, 2nd supplement, 8 October 2026, p. 101. Balance of €8,382.7 million: Social Security as a whole, on a public accounting basis, excluding the previous balance and financial operations. View

[17] Rui Teixeira Santos. Reforma das Pensões em Portugal [Pension Reform in Portugal], edition for the meeting of 21 August 2026, pp. 22–26. Author’s proposal: separation of liabilities, prudential reserves, a three-year social insurance balance index and a gradual reduction in the normal pensionable age. The normal pensionable age and the sustainability factor are distinct legal mechanisms. View

[18] OECD. International Migration Outlook 2026, country note on Portugal, published on 12 November 2026. The country note reports 319,000 in 2025 (+130%) and includes changes of status and free movement. For the difference from Table 1.1 of the same report, see note 24. The foreign-born population refers to 2024; it is not the stock of foreign nationals. View

[19] INE (Statistics Portugal). Indicator 0006056, Permanent immigrants by sex, age group and place of birth. Official API, update of 30 September 2026, extracted on 12 November: 2025, Portugal, both sexes, all ages and places of birth, 254,253 people. Includes nationals and foreign nationals. Definition of permanent immigrant: previous residence abroad and intention to stay for at least one year. View

[20] INE. INEWS No 66, July 2026, pp. 8–10: administratively based population and revision of 2021–2024; 11,424,031 residents in 2025 (+0.32%) and 1,597,539 foreign nationals (14%). Announced timetable: employment in February 2027; reassessment of the National Accounts for 2021 to 2026 in March 2027. INE does not quantify a 15% revision; that figure is solely an analytical scenario considered by the speaker. The population revision does not automatically lead to a proportional change in GDP. View

[21] Eurostat. Real GDP per capita, metadata for indicator sdg_08_10, section 4.1. The indicator relates real GDP to the average population of the year. The growth examples and calculations presented are hypothetical. View

[22] Eurostat. General government gross debt, metadata for indicator sdg_17_40. The ratio relates end-of-year debt to GDP at current prices. The examples of the denominator effect are arithmetical calculations, not forecasts for Portugal. View

[23] Public Finance Council. Perspetivas Económicas e Orçamentais 2026–2030 [Economic and Budgetary Outlook 2026–2030], 2026 update, section on the macroeconomic outlook under unchanged policies. The text describes the labour market as being at full employment and notes that the size and direction of the statistical revisions cannot yet be anticipated. This description does not show that all observed unemployment is purely structural. View

[24] OECD. International Migration Outlook 2026, chapter «Recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants», Table 1.1 and commentary on Portugal. The chapter links the increase to the resolution of pending applications and refers to around 300,000 permits between September 2024 and December 2025, a period different from calendar year 2025. The table shows 313,700 in 2025 (+139%), while the country note shows 319,000 (+130%); the internal difference should be clarified and does not allow new physical arrivals to be inferred. The standardised indicator includes changes of status and free movement. View

[25] International Labour Organization. Labour productivity: Some frequently asked questions, 24 September 2014. Defines productivity as GDP per person employed or per hour worked. The calculation uses the identity between real GDP, employment and productivity per employed person. Six million employed people is a rounded scenario base, not an official estimate of the employed population. 1% of that base is 60,000 and 2% is 120,000. The calculation assumes constant productivity and measures the net increase in employment; it does not quantify gross immigrant inflows. The labour force includes the employed and the unemployed. View

[26] OECD. OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2026, chapter «Tackling Portugal’s housing affordability challenge: promoting sustainable and inclusive housing», discussion of demographic factors and Figure 4.9. The report links population growth and household formation to demand, in a market with persistent supply constraints. It does not quantify any share of rent increases attributable to immigration. View

[27] European Commission. Country report – Portugal, 2026, section 4, «Strengthening healthcare, long-term care and social protection to ensure equal access to services and reduce poverty». The analysis identifies staff shortages, difficulties in accessing a family doctor and territorial inequalities. The reference to demographic pressure is a planning inference: more residents imply potential care needs; the scale depends on age, location, health status and installed capacity. No unproven share of the SNS’s difficulties is attributed to immigration. View

Papers