Abstract
The European Union’s competitiveness agenda, grounded in the 2024 Draghi and Letta reports and translated into regulatory practice by the 2026 Report on Banking Competitiveness and the draft Merger Guidelines of April 2026, regards continental scale as the main instrument for overcoming the Union’s productivity and investment gap. This article argues that scale-driven consolidation cannot be pursued as a goal in its own right without coming into material tension with the Union’s own legal architecture. Drawing on fiscal federalism, the normative theory of subsidiarity and the industrial organisation literature on complementarity between firms of different sizes, I propose a reading according to which Articles 3(3) and 5 TEU, read together with Articles 106(2), 173 and 174 TFEU and with Protocol No 26 on Services of General Interest, ground what I call the Dual Scale Doctrine. Under this doctrine, Union policies that favour consolidation at continental scale must be accompanied by instruments specifically designed to preserve the vitality of operators at local, regional and national scale. An analysis of the case law on Portuguese golden shares, of Commission v CK Telecoms and of the draft Merger Guidelines — which elevate industrial scale to a substantive parameter in merger assessment without attaching a cohesion dimension to it — shows the inadequacy of unilateral national protectionism and identifies avenues for codification in European Union competition, industrial and cohesion law.


